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Meyer: Evidence - Rules of Admissibility and the Law of Probability

EVIDENCE - RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY

AND THE LAW OF PROBABILITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

There has been great confusion, frustration, and bewilderment as to the role that statistical mathematics ought to
play or does play in the concept of legal proof.' As the science
of probability has become more influential in the world of
the social scientist, the resistance to its application at the
bar has become even more confirmed. Unfortunately, many
of the so-called arguments against the use of this science are
based upon fear and ignorance, being couched in verbiage
that reeks of ad hominem fallacy and begs the question.
The problem would be more easily dismissed if the legal
system itself did not define terms of proof in language that
is definitely predicated upon concepts of mathematical probability. The quantum of evidence required in civil cases is
a preponderance which is defined as more probable than not.'
When approached from a coldly problematical standpoint,
the legal system immediately refuses to honor its own formula
and dismisses the dilemma with a wise word that such mathematical trivium invades the jury's function or that the concept would confuse a lay jury.'
All of this philosophy would be academic if it were not
for the defendant, whose legal rights hang on the outcome
of such a debate. Underlying the dilemma that the legal profession finds itself cast upon is an idea of substantial justice.
For, if the law demands more or less from an inference than
is mathematically possible, then the legal discipline is fabricating arbitrary rules that cannot possibly determine the
true predictability of certain events. As a result, the verdict
is predicated not upon what occurred, but what the law arbitrarily demanded.
1. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 171 (1954).
2. Id. at § 319.
3. See Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of
Proof, 14 VAND. L. REv. 807 (1961).
Copyright@ 1973 by the University of Wyoming
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Fortunately, the divergence between these disciplines
seems to be more semantic and problematic than philosophic.
To understand the problems involved, one must first endeavor
to become familiar with the basic premise upon which probability is founded, and then apply these techniques to legal
proof.
I.

PROBABILITY-SOME CONCEPTS

The legal mind has to overcome more than a fear of math
to fully grasp the concepts of probability. The terms and
phrases of this discipline relate to definite determined relationships. The courts and many legal writings tend to commingle these mathematical terms in a synonymic fashion.
Doing this confuses the argument and from a logical standpoint is fatal.' Statistics, for instance, is a generic term covering many facets of inductive inference, while probability is
a specific term having a definite relationship which uniquely
specifies a mathematical relationship.
A statistical hypothesis is an assumption about the probability model of a random variable; and the test of this hypothesis is a means for accepting or rejecting it.' In essence,
statistical testing is a process for making inductive inferences
from observed data. This process can become highly complicated and technical. This technique is not a concept which has
application in the court room, because the legal inferences lie
within the probability model itself, and not within the methods for making inferences about factual events. The inference to be drawn from a probability model is a jury function.
Probability and probability models, unlike statistical
hypotheses, are measures of likelihood and may be expressed
in percentage terms.6 At the outset, the lawyer must realize
two important principles of probability: the first being that
probability is not some mystical approximation of chance but
a mathematical relationship rigidly defined.7 The other is
Since this discipline is, by its nature, axiomatic, the language is specific in
terms of mathematical relationships.
5. HOEL, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 46 (3d ed. 1962).
6. GUENTHER, CONCEPTS OF STATISTICAL INFERENCE 3-6 (1965).
7. Id.
4.
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that probability never predicts the single event, i.e. there is
no certainty. Probability only relates to the likelihood of an
outcome. If some event has a one-in-a-million chance of
happening, there is still that one chance.
One stumbling block to the understanding of probability
seems to be that there are two distinct definitions. The classical, or a priori, definition is predicated on having n, equally
likely, mutually exclusive events of which f is the number of
favorable outcomes. The probability of a favorable outcome
is then f/n. This gives a ratio with an upper limit of 1 and a
lower limit of 0. Using this definition, one may incorrectly
assume that a coin biased towards coming up heads has a probability of 1/2 of landing on the heads side. In this example,
there are two mutually exclusive events, one of which is
favorable ;8 but they are not equally likely. One can see this
definition can lead to erroneous results. The probability that
the coin will land heads is more likely than the event that it
does not. The second definition takes this into account.
The second definition of probability is referred to as the
relative frequency definition. If an experiment is performed
many times (n) and f of these experiments are favorable,
then the probability of a favorable event is assumed to be
equal to f/n.9 In the biased coin example, if every one of the
previous n trials has resulted in a favorable outcome--a head
-then the quantity f/n will be equal to one. But the probability that a coin will land heads is one, only if the coin is
doubleheaded.
This second definition is the one that is used whenever
the data is available. The first may only be used when the n
events are equally likely, such as the flip of a fair coin or the
role of fair dice. While this distinction may sound superfluous, a misuse of these definitions can lead to incorrect results. A legal example of this problem is illustrated when
the prosecution seeks to show that its exhibit A, a gun, was the
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. In reality, the probability can never approach certainty, or one. Even if
f is equal to n, there is always some small probability that the coin is not
a double headed coin.
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murder weapon. The expert testifies that the gun that killed
the victim had a right-hand rifling. Since any gun could have
either a right-hand or a left-hand rifling, using the classical
definition and assuming that a weapon picked at random is
equally likely to have a right-hand or a left-hand rifling, the
probability that a randomly selected gun could be the weapon
is 1/2. A sample of guns or a report from manufacturers
would show this to be an erroneous assumption, since almost
all the guns in the world have right-hand riflings and only a
small percentage have left-hand riflings. An accurate determination of the probability would be the percentage of all
the guns manufactured that have left-hand riflings. Therefore, the probability that any random gun had right-hand
riflings is extremely high, not 1/2.
For the most part, the jury can get an intuitive feel for
the probability associated with simple examples like throwing
a biased coin or a fair die. But, when a series of these single
probabilities is put together, then intuition fails. The most
important concept in this context is the relation of one event
to another. These relationships are of three types: mutually
exclusive, independent, and dependent.
Two events are mutually exclusive when the happening
of one absolutely precludes the happening of the other." For
instance, the probability that a person could get a two and a
three on a single throw of a single die is zero. This concept is
unknowingly used in legal proof described as alibi. 2 If a
murder took place at tavern A at 9:00 p.m. on October 2, 1971,
the defense may show that no one in bar A saw defendant.
This is not conclusive, since all it proves is that no one saw the
defendant. However, if the defense introduces evidence that
many people did see the defendant in another bar, say B, at
exactly the moment the murder took place, then the proof is
conclusive. The reasoning is predicated on the concept of mutually exclusive events. It is impossible that the defendant
could have been present in bar A and bar B at exactly the
same instant.
11. HOEL, supra note 5, at 7.
12. See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 321.
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Two events are independent of one another if the happening of one event in no way affects the happening of the
second.'" In two flips of a coin, the probability that the
second flip is a head is in no way affected by the outcome of
the first toss. Another way of saying this is that the outcome
of the second event "does not care" or is in no way predicated
upon the outcome of the first. The probability of the second
flip of a fair coin is going to be 1/2, no matter the result of
the first flip. WVhen two events are independent, the order of
their happening has no affect on the probability. The probability of getting two heads is the same whether the coin is
flipped twice or two coins are flipped at the same time.
Two events are dependent when the outcome of one event
affects the probability of the outcome of the second. 4 If
there are three white and two black balls in a bag, the probability of drawing a white ball on the second of two successive
draws, without replacement, depends on the outcome of the
first draw. If a black ball is drawn first, then the probability
that a white ball is drawn on the second draw is 3/4. There
are only four balls left when the second draw commences and
three of them are white. However, if the first draw was a
white ball, the probability of getting a white ball on the second
draw is only 2/4 or 1/2. Again, there are four balls left, but
now only two of the remaining are white.
The concept of dependency may also be expressed as the
probability of event A given that B has occurred. In the above
example, the probability of getting a white ball on the second
draw (event A) depended upon the color of the first drawn
ball (event B). Once event B was determined, the probability
of event A could be determined. Event A was "conditioned"
upon the outcome of B.
The concept of relevancy in legal proof is based upon the
concept of the dependent event. Since relevancy is probative
worth and not really a rule of evidence, it establishes a "connection" or "relationship" between event A and event B."
13. HOEL, supra note 5, at 7.
14.
15.

Id.
MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 151.
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Contrawise "irrelevant material" establishes no probative
relationship between event A and event B. That is, event A
and event B are independent; the happening of one in no
way affects the outcome of the other. Unfortunately, to add
to the confusion, law has adopted the term relevancy for determining admissibility of other evidence that cannot be measured in terms of dependent and independent events. Some
writers call this type of relevance "legal relevancy, ' "' as
distinguished from "logical relevancy." Instead of having a
logical basis, the rules are predicated on policy.
III. THE CONJUNCTIVE AND DISJuNCIVE CONSTRUCT
The preceding discussion, definitions, and examples are
the heart of the logical concept of discrete events that may
be described in terms of a mathematical model. Unfortunately, real-life situations and especially fact situations in a
law suit rarely present themselves in the simplistic guise of
the flip of a eoin or the roll of a die. When a witness testifies
that she saw A in tavern B, she is relating a large number of
pieces of information. She matches eye color, skin tone,
height, weight, etc. of the man she saw and the man A.
In probability theory there must also be a way to relate
a set of events, each of which has a probability which is determined by the f/n formula. The devices used for this are
called the multiplication and addition theorems. The former
is predicated on the logical "and" or the conjunctive, the
latter upon the logical "or" or disjunctive. The result obtained is dependent upon the types of events that are "multiplied" or "added" together."
The "multiplication" theorem allows one to calculate
the probability that many events occur together. What is
the probability that event I and event 2 occur ? The answer
gives the probability that both occur or the logical conjunctive.
While this concept seems simple enough, the problem lies in
the types of events that are to be "multiplied." If the events
16. See James, Relevancy, Probability, and the Law, 29 CALiF. L. REV. 689
(1941); Cowan, Decision Theory in Law, Science, and Technology, 17 RuTGERS L. REV. 499, 502-05 (1963).
17. Hoax , supra note 5, at 8-12.
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are inutually exclusive, then the probability that event 1 and
event 2 occur at the same time is zero. For example, if one
were to try to determine the probability that a man was
white (event 1) and also a Negro (event 2), the probability
is zero. He can't be both white and Negro at the same time.
If, however, the two events are independent, and not mutually
exclusive, the probabilities are algebraically multiplied together.'" For instance, to determine the probability of getting two heads in two tosses of a coin, the probability of getting one head (1/2) is multiplied times the probability of getting a second head (since they are independent, the probability
is also 1/2) and the answer is 1/4. The last possibility is that
the two events are dependent. The probability that event 1
and event 2 occur together is the probability that event 1
occurs times the probability that event 2 occurs given event 1
has occurred. Going back to the example of the balls in a
bag, and drawing without replacement, the probability that
a white and then a black ball is drawn is equal to the probability that a white is drawn on the first draw (3/5) times the
probability a black is drawn on the second, given a white was
drawn on the first (1/2)." 9
The "addition law" is similar in application except that
the question becomes the logical disjunctive. What is the
probability that even 1 or event 2 occur? For example, in
the mutually exclusive case of the die, the probability that a
two or a three is rolled equals the probability a two is rolled
(1/6) plus the probability a three is rolled (1/6). The probability is then 1/3. Derivation of the independent and dependent cases is similar.20
18. Id.
19. Id.

20.
Mutually Exclusive
Mult

= 0

Add

= Pr(E )+Pr(E.)-P(E,Ed

Independent
P(&X) P(E,)
P(E )+P(E,)-P(EE.)

Dependent
P (E,)

P(E,/E )

P(E )+P(E.)-P(E E,)

Where: Pr(Ei)
Probability of Event 1
Pr(E 1 )
Probability of Event 2
Pr(E/El)
Probability that E2 occurs given that E , has already
occurred.
Pr(EEs) = Probability that E, and E 2 occur together
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In the legal setting, this ability to "cumulate" ascertainable events is invaluable. Going back to the murder weapon
example, if one assumes for argument that the probability
of right-hand versus left-hand turns on a pistol is 1/2 and the
probability that it is a revolver is 1/2 and that it"shaves"
the bullet on the right is 1/2, then the probability that any
random gun has these independent characteristics is (1/2)
(1/2) (1/2) or 1/8. If exhibit A has these characteristics,
then the probability that the exhibited gun is, in fact, the
murder weapon becomes more certain, that is the exhibited
weapon is not any random gun. The more significant independent events that the exhibit A and the murder weapon
have in common, the "more likely" that exhibit A and the
theoretical gun that killed the victim are the same gun. At
some point, a reasonable man would say that they are the same
21

gull.

IV.

NATURE

AND

THE LAW OF PROBABILITY

One last concept need be explored prior to applying these
concepts to the field of legal proof. Thus far, the mathematical models discussed are predicated upon the randomness
of the law of nature.2 2 The uncertainty of the event is known
within the model, and is dependent solely upon the way nature
operates on an object in the state of nature. This concept is
randomness under uncertainty and gives credence to the
models.2"
If one were to flip a coin one thousand times in succession
recording the favorable responses such that it resulted in a
determination of f/n, then the probability that this coin gives
favorable response is assumed to be f/n. The repetitiveness
of the experiment is a requisite to making the probability
models thus far discussed meaningful. Factors such as temperature, lighting, how the coin feels today, have little or no
relevance to the probability of the coin turning up heads.
21. Statisticians draw inferences under uncertainty by determining the error
under the distribution. They are called Type 1 and Type 2 errors. See HOEL,
supra note 5, at 48-61.
22. CHERNOFF & MOSES, ELEMENTARY DECISION THEORY §§ 1-4, at 1-12 (1959).
23. PARZEN, MODERN PROBABILITY THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS 5-8 (1960).
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With man, however, the relationship of factors to his performance becomes obscured, and using the simple models
discussed here becomes hazardous. Human behavior lacks the
repetitiveness that the coin example has. Man's memory and
interpretation of the conditions may make him react in a way
that is not consistent with past observations.
Sociologists, psychologists, and economists have been
plagued by this fact since they began to study human behavior. Concepts such as the "economic man" have been
introduced to try to alleviate the inherent problems.2 4 But,
the uncertainty under these assumptions renders the simple
models presented here subject to large error.
Some legal examples may help to make this concept more
clear. If A is indicted for murder and the prosecution shows
that A had committed five other murders, is the evidence of
the five other murders logically relevant? The answer is
uncertain. Everyone would believe that if a person murdered
five other people, the probability that he would murder a
sixth is greater than if he had previously murdered no one.
But because each murder is under different circumstances
which A interprets and reacts to differently, the simple f/n
models cannot give relevant information to a jury. Contrast
this to the gun example given previously. If a bullet from
exhibit A (the weapon) showed the firearm to have righthand rifling, etc. then the next bullet will show the same. In
dealing with human behavior, the experiment lacks this "repetitiveness" under nature. In the coin or bullet examples,
one can essentially ignore the errors that occur in the state
of nature because they are negligible. A gun does not react
differently if it is pointed at A rather than B. With human
nature, one cannot get this unbiasedness, and the error becomes so large as to obviate the models.25
In one case2" the court allowed evidence of a similar offer
to contract between defendant and another party to be admitted to prove the substance of an oral contract between
CHRIST, ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND METHODS §§ 1-5, at 1-14 (1966).
There exists a whole discipline which concerns itself with human behavioral
decision making. See CHERNOFF & MOSES, supra note 22.
26. Firlotte v. Jesse, 76 Cal. App. 2d 207, 172 P.2d 710 (1946).

24.
25.
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plaintiff and defendant. The Court of Appeals, in upholding
the admission of such evidence, contended that a logical inference could be drawn between the previous offers by defendant to another party and the contract in issue." That is,
the proving of event A (subsequent offer to third party) said
something mathematically about the probability of event B
(contract between plaintiff and defendant). As was seen
previously, this is a statement of conditional probability.
What is probability of event B, given event A has happened ?
Since the act of making a contract is subject to all the conditions upon which the contract is based including the feelings
of the parties and their relative bargaining powers, a contract made with A and one made with B are for all practical
purposes independent events. The mere happening of the
first says nothing determinative about the probability of the
second. This makes the prior offer logically irrelevant. Unfortunately, Wigmore seems to be in accord with this holding,
contending that such evidence is relevant when circumstances
in onc situation indicate a strong probability that the contract in one instance is the contract in another.2 8 The law
makes the defendant pay based upon a presupposition that
cannot be determined by probability.
V.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL

EVIDENCE

AND

PROBABILITY

The legal discipline generally accepts the proposition
that evidence is of two basic types. The first is designated
"direct" and proves the fact in issue.29 There is no need for
logical inferences in this type of evidence, because the sole
question to be "legally" determined is its worthiness of belief." If a witness says, "I saw the defendant shoot the victim," then the only determination to be made is the veracity
of the witness's statement. If he is telling the truth, then the
inference under probability is the trivial case of conditional
probability. What is the probability of getting a white ball
on the second draw given that a white ball was drawn on the
27. Id. at 208, 172 P.2d at 711.
28. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 377 (3d ed. 1940).
29. MCCORMICK, 8upra note 1, § 162.

30. Id.
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second draw? The answer, of course, is one (certainty), if
and only if the observer is telling the truth.
The determination by the jury that a witness is telling
the truth is also outside the mathematical models presented,
since "telling the truth" is human behavior and subject to
all the restrictions discussed in the previous section. 1 Introduction of evidence that the witness never told the truth is of
value in determining if he is telling the truth in this
dubious
32
case.
The question of logical relevancy is more meaningful in
the second type of evidence. 3 Circumstantial evidence gives
rise to two determinations. The first is concerned with whether the event sought to be shown actually happened. Again,
this has to do with the veracity of the witness. The second is
predicated upon whether the event shown by the witness is
logically relevant or probative of the fact sought to be
"proved." The concepts of probability that have thus far
been discussed go only to the second question.
Unless the first question is answered in the affirmative,
i.e. that event A happened, then any further attempt to show
logical relevancy between event A and event B is futile. The
probability model for conditional probability is explicit. The
probability of event B (drawing a white ball on the second
draw) is only meaningful given event A (the result on the
first draw). If the fact that event A happened is disbelieved,
then it is as if it did not happen and event B is no greater or
less probable than prior to the introduction of the evidence.
This dichotomy has a drawback that may be overlooked.
When a witness says, "I saw A kill the victim," then this is
direct evidence. But, if she says, " I saw a man with blue
eyes, brown hair, etc.," the evidence becomes circumstantial.
The distinction between these two types of evidence is not
always clear. It is difficult to objectively determine how
many independent factors must be present before the evi31. This statement is not intended to draw fire from the psychologists. No
philosophic argument about the ability of the pathologic liar to tell the
truth is intended. The statement is predicated solely upon logic.
82. CHERNOFp & MosEs, supra note 22.
3. MCCORMICK, supro, note 1, § 152.
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dence becomes direct, since all a direct witness does is make
the determniation from the independent factors. Once the

evidence is determined to be circumstantial, then the same
problem discussed earlier in the gun example presents itself.
How many similar factors must be present between the defendant and the man the witness saw, before there exists a
legally sufficient quantum of evidence such that the jury
may determine that the man the witness described and the
defendant are one in the same ?
VI.

PEOBABILITY-MISAPPLICATION

AT

LAW

In 1968, the Supreme Court of California heard People
v. Collins." This case directly raised the question of whether
evidence of mathematical probability introduced by the prosecutor to identify the defendants had been properly presented.
A woman was mugged and could not identify the assailant or
her accomplice; a witness saw a blond ponytailed girl run out
of the alley where the crime had taken place, get into a partly
yellow car driven by a bearded, mustached Negro and speed
away.
The prosecutor proceeded to call a college mathematician
as an expert witness to determine the mathematical likelihood
that any couple could possess six particular characteristics.
These characteristics were: (1) a blond woman; (2) a woman
with a ponytail; (3) partly yellow automobile; (4) man with
mustache; (5) Negro man with a beard; (6) an interracial
couple in a car. The jury convicted the defendants of second
degree robbery.
In reversing the conviction, the California Supreme
Court, after making the usual argument that such evidence
invaded the jury's province, 5 proceeded to explore the approach used to determine the likelihood estimator introduced
by the prosecution. The court made it clear that the holding
in no way negated the use of probability theory in evidence,
but instead found fault with the particular method used."
84. 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968).
35. Id.
36. Id.
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Using the background previously laid in this paper, both
the prosecution's original methods and the court's admonition
of those methods may be analyzed. First, to make the process
easier, one must realize that the evidence is circumstantial
because no identifying witness could be found. 7 The problem
then becomes akin to the gun example. 8
The prosecution assigned probabilities (f/n) to the six
characteristics. Then assuming their independence, the prosecution proceeded to use the multiplication rule3 9 to determine
the probability that any couple, picked at random, would have
all six characteristics. The number derived was one in 12
million.
A. Probability Determination of Each Character
The determination of the probability that a single factor
will occur is equal to f/n, and may be determined by the a
priori or relative frequency method." An a priori determination is impossible since the total population is unknown, but
the relative frequency definition is plausible. The prosecution, however, guessed at the relative frequencies and the
court cited the rule that such odds are inadmissible when not
based upon demonstrated data.4 1 This criticism is well founded, since failure to correctly assign the probability function
leads to fatal analytical error.
Aside from the obvious mistake of failing to substantiate
the likelihood function, other more subtle errors existed with
the prosecution's case. Likelihood functions exist only for
events subject to the state of nature. Therefore, any characteristic that is subject to human decision may not be relied
upon to produce dependable results. The characteristics of
an inter-racial couple is only viable if some static attribute
may be attached thereto. The prosecution assigned this characteristic a probability of 1 in 1,000. These figures were evidently predicated upon the assumption that the couple seen
37. Id. at 38, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
38. See Section V supra.
39. See Section III supra.
40. See Section II supra.
41. State v. Snead, 76 N.M. 349, 414 P.2d 858 (1966).
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by the witness were, in fact, married. Such an assumption
could not be shown true by the evidence presented; and without such proof, the association becomes purely arbitrary.2
The characteristic of a ponytail suffers a like fallacy. A
hairdo is subject to the whims of the wearer and is not static
under the laws of nature. Any attempt to determine the probability that any given person is wearing a ponytail would have
to be based upon a survey taken the hour of the robbery, plus
a showing that defendant actually wore her hair that way on
the day of the crime. Any attempt to prove that defendant
always wore a ponytail is of no consequence. That mode of
dress is voluntary and even a sAowing that she never wore her
hair any other way is not determinative. 3
The same criticism may be leveled at each of the characteristics introduced by the prosecution. A blond may dye her
hair, a man can shave a beard or conversely wear a false one,
and a car can be painted. The court recognized the fallacy
by pointing to the ease of disguise. The problem with the
court's analysis is that it proceeded to beg the question by
demanding more of probability than is demanded of a testifying witness. The court's argument is that no formula may
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the witness correctly
described characteristics possessed by the couple who actually
committed the crime. 4 Admittedly, the criticism is valid, but
the fact remains that no court of law may be sure that a witness saw what he thinks he saw. Even eye-witnesses to a
crime may be deceived by disguises and point out the wrong
man. The jury determines the truth of the statement, whether
probability is used or not. 5
The real criticism of misidentifying characteristics when
using probability theory, lies in the innuendo drawn from the
likelihood function itself. Since the probability function is
predicated on favorable results found in a population, a mistake as to what constitutes a favorable result (f) is fatal. For
example, if the probability that one is a blond is 3/4, then
42.
43.
44.
45.

See Section IV supra.
Id.
Supra note 34 at 40, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
See Section V, eupra.
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three out four people over a large sample will be blond. The
probability of any given person being a blond is 3/4. If the
culprit is a blond, then this eliminates one out of every four
people as the possible criminal. But, if the culprit, in reality,
is not a blond, the ratio 3/4 is erroneous.
The court finds further fault in that the frequency function is not based upon sound evidence that the population
included possible criminals." The argument, simply stated,
finds fault with the likelihood function because the population
(n) says nothing about who should be included. If n includes
all people in California, then there is nothing to show that all
people in California are culprits or suspects. This argument
assumes that probability theory, in order to be valid, must
assume a population of potential criminals, i.e. people with
criminal intent or motive. The assumption is not true. The
only requirement is that there be a possibility that the witness saw someone from the population (n). Whether it could
have been a grocer or an ex con is of no import. The only hypothesis that a frequency function is predicated upon is that
a particular characteristic be present within the population.
The hypothesis is valid for any sufficiently large n, as long as
f is a subset of n.4"
B. Use of the Multiplication Theorem
Once the likelihood functions (f/n) were determined for
each characteristic, the prosecution proceeded to multiply the
functions together. This resulted in the probability of one in
12 million that all characteristics occur together in a random
couple. In order for this method to be valid, each characteristic must be independent.4 8
The court expressed its doubts as to this fact by pointing
out the fallacy in assuming a beard and a mustache are independent characteristics." This is a valid criticism of the
characteristics presented since it could be shown that having
a beard is related to having a mustache.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Supra note 34 at 38, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
FREUND, MATHEMATICAL STATISTIcs 7-15 (1962).
See Section II, supra.
Supra note 34 at 39, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
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The court seems to go one step further and negate any
attempt to use probability theory, since one can never be sure
whether events are in fact independent."0 This, of course, is
not the case. There is a whole body of statistical theory called
correlation and regression, which concerns itself with this
exact problem.
C. Application of the Discipline
Although the criticisms of the data manipulation in the
incident case were sufficient for reversal, the court went further in negating the use of probability theory as applied to
legal proof.2 In so doing, the court exposed some the tradi3
tional misunderstandings of principles discussed earlier.
The first glaring error the court made pertains to the
maxim that probability does not predict the single event. The
error the court found was that the probability figure did not
shed any light upon the issue of the defendants' guilt, because
it did not prove that, of the few couples with those characteristics, defendants were guilty. This is clearly a fallacious
criticism of the discipline. The court would ask of probability
what it cannot ask of any circumstantial evidence, i.e. certainty. The only fact that was sought to be proved by introduction of such evidence is the likelihood that any random
couple would possess the characteristics of the true guilty
parties. In no way did the evidence establish that they were
the guilty ones. Circumstantial evidence can never do this.
The second criticism of the method is akin to the first,
but varies in degree. The court preceeded, upon its own, to
show that the probability that there existed at least one other
couple with these specific traits was about 40o." Admitting
prosecution's figure of one in 12 million, the court calculated,
by use of a Poisson approximation of the binomial theorem,"
that given 12 million random couples, the probability that
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
HOEL, supra note 5, at 160.
Supra note 34 at 39-40, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 503-04.
See Section II, supra.
Supra note 34 at 42-43, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 506-07.
GUENTHER, supra note 6. at 37-42.
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there existed another couple with exactly the same traits as
the defendants was about 40%.
To the statistically unadroit, this sounds like a phenomenal number, but in fact, it proves the prosecution's case. What
this number means is that if 12 million couples were randomly
sampled, the chances of finding two couples with the same
characteristics are only 40%. in other words, there is only
a 40% chance that a second so designated couple even exists I
This is a staggering number out of 12 million couples. To put
this number in perspective, a probability of one in twelve
million would be like getting 23 heads in a row on 23 tosses
of a fair coin. When an eye witness takes the stand and absolutely identifies a defendant as the guilty party, the probability that he is one of a set of identical twins is 1 in 500 or
2,400 times as great ! Therefore, given that defendant has
the characteristics of being one of a set of identical twins, then
the probability that in twelve million people there is another
with this characteristic is almost one. Further, this makes
the probability that the witness saw the defendant's twin or
that the defendant is the wrong man equal to 1/2.

VII. CONCLUSIONS
There are two inherent difficulties in applying mathematical probability to circumstantial evidence. The first lies
in the fact that it is a mathematical concept which, despite its
simplicity, appears to courts as an esoteric and mystical invasion of traditional legal functions. As a result, many of the
well-founded legal arguments against use of these methods
continuously beg the question. The legal profession incessantly refuses to acquaint itself with even the simplest of
maxims. This leads to a total rejection of probability as a
fact-finding tool, without a fair evaluation on the merits.
The second difficulty occurs because of the inability of
the legal profession to lay an adequate foundation for mathe56.

See Reid, Does Inheritance Matter in Disease? The Use of Twin Studies in
Medical Research, STATISTICS: A GUIDE TO THE UNKNOWN (Tanur ed. 1972).
57. This number is based upon the Poisson approximation for the binomial using
a sample size of 12 million which is 1-2e-I/1-e.
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matical determination of the factual situations. Many of the
criticisms leveled at the theory are, in fact, inherent fallacies
in assumption about the data. These errors will never surface,
unless the theory is understood. Faulting a discipline as inconsistent, when the assumptions under the theorems are
wrong, is hardly a valid criticism.
A possible solution would be to employ a set of statistically significant presumptions which are legally raised when
a certain number of independent factors are proved. This is
now done with evidence such as finger printing and blood
samples.5" Once the presumption has been raised, then only
a showing that the fact presumed (fingerprint identity) is
not applicable to the case before the court will negate the
presumption. This can be done by showing that of those identical prints that could exist in the world, the defendant's are
not the set in question. Defendant may have lost his fingers
prior to the crime or set up defense of alibi conclusively
proving that the set of prints are not his if the alibi is believed
by the jury.
Another possibility is to give the court its own statistical
witness who has been admitted to some standard organization
and is versed in some aspects of the law. Both sides would be
able to cross-examine, as they can any other witness. His job
would be to advise the judge of the probability models to be
used so that they could be given to the jury by way of instruction. Then, the jury could draw their own inferences from the
data. As long as traditional concepts of due process are not
abridged, this system is workable.
No matter the procedure adopted, the author feels that
continually ignoring the problem is ludicrous. The jury is
overtaxed by being forced to determine both the veracity of
a witness and the probability that given event A, event B will
occur. The only help the law affords is nebulous terms such
as "more likely than not," or "a preponderance of the evidence. "
58. See Note, Evidence: Scientific Devices: Use of the Chemical Tests for
Determining Intoxication, 1 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 610 (1954).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol8/iss1/10

18

Meyer: Evidence - Rules of Admissibility and the Law of Probability

1973

COMMENTS

In the Collins" case previously discussed, one finds the
proposition that a jury could determine the probability of
the couple's guilt a little far fetched. If the prosecution had
been correct in the assertion that the probability that any
random couple would have similar characteristics was one in
12 million, then leaving such a number to be determined by
the jury is ridiculous. Once given the probabilities under the
appropriate model, the inferences to be drawn, as well as the
belief of the witnesses, becomes much easier.
One must ultimately think of a defendant whose freedom
rides on a jury bombarded with complex innuendos and logical constructs that even the courts, to date, have not been
able to straighten out.
LEE G. MEYER

59. People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968).
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